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Background: In response to the spread of HIV caused by needle sharing among injection drug users (IDUs), the
Taiwan Centers for Disease Control implemented a pilot harm reduction program in 2005 that expanded nationwide in
2006. The policy led to a significant reduction in the number of HIV-positive cases among IDUs in 4 years.
Methods: This article aims to provide a critical evaluation of this harm reduction policy in Taiwan. The research
leading to this article included a thorough literature review and in-depth interviews with 31 active policy
participants, including people working in hospitals, the academia, non-governmental organizations, community
pharmacies, the legal system, and health authorities at both the central and local levels. The collected data were
analyzed on the basis of situational analysis.
Results: The article examines the policy success by showing how this policy was assembled and by exposing the
frictions and adjustments during its formation and implementation. Inter-departmental conflicts within or without
the government and the efforts to coordinate them are addressed, and the transnational dimensions of this harm
reduction policy are also discussed. The article then reflects on the effects of the policy and asks where the line
should be drawn between what is harm reduction and what is not.
Conclusions: This case illustration reveals the complexity of understanding an assembled health policy that
involves multiple participants. The article intends to render an analytic account to enable a comparison with
similar policies in other countries.
Keywords: Harm reduction, Taiwan, Assemblage, HIV, Transnationality
Background
Taiwan is an island country populated by approximately
23 million people with a gross domestic product per
capita of $22,632 in 2014 [1]. The portion of people liv-
ing below the poverty line is 1.51 % of the population
[2]. Although the percentage is a disputable number, it
remains the lowest in the world. A relatively stable
economy in the past few decades has resulted in Taiwan
facing emerging socio-economic problems, such as un-
equal accumulation of capital and means of production,
industrial outsourcing, booms and bubbles of land and
the housing market, and a fluctuating relationship with
Mainland China.
After World War II, Taiwan was ceded by Japan to
China’s Nationalist government, which retreated to this
island after its defeat in Mainland China to the Chinese
Communist Party. In the immediate postwar period, psy-
choactive substance use, even within medical interven-
tion, was strictly regulated by law. As a result, illegal
drug use was not a widespread social concern until the
end of martial law in 1986. The end of martial law led to
the beginning of a new era characterized by exuberant
communication among people and organizations. Unfor-
tunately, this development also ushered in the smuggling
of illegal drugs across the Taiwan Strait in the years to
follow. In the early 1990s, Taiwan witnessed a surge in
amphetamine and heroin use that quickly caught the
government’s attention and led to police actions. Under
the Narcotics Elimination Act, a large number of people
Correspondence: jschen1973@ym.edu.tw
Institute of Science, Technology and Society, National Yang-Ming University,
155, Sec. 2, Linong St., Beitou District, Taipei City 11221, Taiwan
© 2016 Chen. Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative
Commons license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://
creativecommons.org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Chen Harm Reduction Journal  (2016) 13:11 
DOI 10.1186/s12954-016-0101-6
were arrested and subsequently imprisoned for drug
crimes. Eventually, they comprised the majority of jail
inmates. In the mid-1990s, the Taiwanese government
began to wage war on drugs and discussed possible revi-
sions to applicable laws and policies to respond to the
increase in drug crimes. Drug users were encouraged to
seek adequate treatment from medical institutions be-
fore they were arrested. The revision and renaming of
the Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act in 1998 ushered in
a new stage, in which more participants in drug use
treatment were allowed and a number of psychiatrists
who specialized in addiction intervention and treatment
were required. However, compared with the mainstream
psychiatric community, these psychiatrists were few and
marginal. Given the long-held belief that addiction is an
intractable personal moral defect and the limited re-
sources allocated to illegal drug use and users, psychiatric
treatments and interventions were not fully recognized
and utilized.
Ironically, drug users, especially those who inject her-
oin, finally obtained their long-deserved attention from
the government not because they were de-stigmatized
but because they were doubly stigmatized, both as ab-
ject drug users and as dangerous public threats carrying
and transmitting HIV. The first AIDS patient was iden-
tified in 1984. The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control
(TCDC) was the agency responsible for the prevention
and intervention of the disease. Free medical treat-
ments for HIV/AIDS were offered by the government
to ensure better control of this endemic [3, 4]. Men
having sex with men (MSM) were considered the major
reason for HIV infection, followed by heterosexual con-
tact [5]. By contrast, injection drug users (IDUs), who
mostly depend on heroin, were not considered as a
major risk population until around 2003 (Fig. 1). The
transmission of HIV among IDUs rapidly escalated in
the next 2 years, eventually comprising 72 % of new
cases in 2005. Sharing needles and diluting solution ap-
peared to be the most likely route of disease transmis-
sion among this group [6]. More alarmingly, the IDU
group was less likely to seek medical treatment than
the sexual contact group, and this situation meant that
the HIV endemic could escape medical and administra-
tive attention more easily [5]. Thus, in response to this
emerging public health threat, the TCDC announced
that it would implement a pilot harm reduction pro-
gram in 2005 that focused on four administrative re-
gions (Taipei City, Taipei County, Taoyuan County, and
Tainan County). These regions were selected either due
to their high rates of drug use or due to their socio-
political significance. The TCDC expanded the program
nationwide in 2006 [5, 7].
In 4 years, the policy has accomplished a significant
reduction in the number of reported cases of HIV/
AIDS among IDUs (Fig. 1, see year 2005 onward). Stud-
ies have also shown that criminal arrests involving Sched-
ule I substances (predominantly heroin) decreased over
the years [8].
Fig. 1 Reported number of HIV-positive injection drug users, 1984-2014. Note that the new HIV cases from all causes (purple line) increase in 2009
while the number representing new HIV-positive drug users (green line) keeps declining (adopted from TCDC [22])
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This article aims to provide a critical assessment of the
harm reduction policy in Taiwan and to problematize
the success of the policy by presenting its formation and
exposing the frictions and adaptations during its imple-
mentation. This case illustration intends to render an
analytic account to enable a comparison with similar
policies in other countries.
Methods
This article stems mainly from my doctoral research,
which was conducted in the period of 2004–2009 [9].
This research has been supplemented with follow-up ob-
servations from then on. My doctoral research was a
qualitative study that examined the unfolding of the
harm reduction policy in Taiwan as a project that both
promoted public health and facilitated addiction-related
scientific knowledge. The goal was pursued by tracing
the inter-departmental coordination within the govern-
ment, the interactions between government bureaucracy
and professional experts, and the engagement and evo-
lution of various academic disciplines involved. The
research included a thorough literature review and in-
depth interviews with 31 active policy participants, re-
cruited through snowball sampling and with informed
consent from 2007 to 2009, that is, during the heyday
of the policy implementation. These participants were
clinical workers including psychiatrists, pharmacists,
and case managers (n = 9), academic professionals
devoted to HIV and/or drug research (n = 6), non-
governmental organization (NGO) workers (n = 2),
legal professionals (n = 2), and bureaucrats from health
authorities at the central and local levels (n = 12).
Some of the participants were interviewed more than
once to verify or follow up certain points. Their ac-
counts were treated not as simple statements of truth
but as situated reflections of personal experience and
opinion subject to analytic scrutiny. The collected data
were analyzed on the basis of situational analysis,
which is a postmodern version of grounded theory
proposed by Adele Clarke [10]. Situational analysis
aims to sort out information through a series of cod-
ing, memo-taking, and mapping. It takes collected in-
formation not as statements of reality but as parts of
situated knowledge and perspective held by partici-
pants and narrators. Therefore, situational analysis
does not aim to identify a single social process that ac-
counts for a social phenomenon but to reassemble the
sophisticated social phenomenon with contestations
and incongruences. It is an effective analytic tool that
can powerfully illustrate the discursive cacophony in a
policy arena where multiple voices counter one another.
During the analysis, particular emphasis was placed
on the specific manner in which this policy was de-
signed, formulated, and implemented. Contestations
and frictions during the policy process were also ex-
plored. The transnational aspect of this policy was ad-
dressed to highlight the transfer process of the novel
concept of harm reduction when it first attracted pub-
lic and governmental attention in Taiwan. By delineat-
ing the contour of the policy from domestic and
transnational influences, this article attempts to pro-
vide a point of reference for latecomer countries within
or beyond Asia that will adopt harm reduction policy
and other health promotion strategies.
Results
Frictions of a transnational policy assemblage
The harm reduction policy in Taiwan was never a
clearly planned, top-down project from the outset. Ra-
ther, it was characterized by local emergent variations
and improvisations. When a pilot program targeted at
IDUs was announced by the Department of Health
(DOH) in 2005, harm reduction was portrayed as a
three-pronged policy that would include expanded edu-
cation and screening, a needle syringe program, and an
opioid maintenance treatment (OMT). However, many
barriers and objections to the policy implementation
soon surfaced. Whereas some measures, such as free
HIV testing for all pregnant women, encountered little
pressure, some measures were upsetting to the public
or other branches of the government, including the dis-
tribution of free needles and syringes through public
health venues and voluntary community pharmacies,
and the provision of free oral methadone as a mainten-
ance treatment for heroin to avoid injection-related
health consequences. These objections could be vehe-
ment, as the liberating ideas and practices of harm re-
duction (i.e., the government giving free needles and
maintenance medications to active drug users) were
simply unacceptable given the long tradition of sup-
pression and prohibition in terms of illegal drug use.
Thus, practical barriers included socio-cultural aspects
and bureaucratic coordination and policy details that
involved both central and local governments, NGOs,
professions concerned, and drug users.
In consideration of these difficulties, the year-long
pilot program pinpointed four administrative regions as
previously stated. As the success of the pilot program
was a primary concern, the DOH had to persuade other
central government departments to work together, par-
ticularly the Ministry of Justice (representing the prose-
cutors) and the National Policy Agency under the
Ministry of Interiors (representing the policemen). Des-
pite the current Narcotics Hazard Prevention Act
allowing for more medical intervention, the use of il-
legal drugs such as heroin was still viewed by most
prosecutors and police officers as an act of crime, not a
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manifestation of an illness. A high-ranking DOH officer
described the sources of the difficulty as follows:
“….First were our colleagues, especially those from the
Ministry of Justice….Then, the public representatives.
They usually did not agree with this idea. Third, the
media. They did not like this, either. As a result, we
needed to deal with these three [oppositions] all at
once. How? You talked many times, many times, and
it took time, a lot of time to persuade….”
Constant conflicts and negotiations over the potential
effects of harm reduction practice (e.g., does it promote
health or facilitate crime?) characterized the central gov-
ernment’s efforts to implement this policy. These dis-
agreements also echoed the daily reality of frontline
workers. A physician shared his observation on the po-
lice force in a methadone clinic:
“The National Police Agency announced that it did
not encourage policemen to hang around [the clinic]
and make arrests, but this order depended on the
situation and it differed from time to time. When
advisors from Australia came to visit us, they told us
that we should work closely with the police, but not
so closely that we wanted them to stay….Now we are
more troubled by the inaction of the police. Drug
crimes take place right here, but they simply do not
intervene. Perhaps it’s because they do not get credit
for it.”
Maintaining an optimal distance from the police and
prosecutors seemed to be an important issue for health
workers devoted to harm reduction measures, centrally
and locally. This issue also mattered for people working
in hospital settings and in community pharmacies that
provided free needles and syringes. I addressed else-
where [11] that the improvisation of these workers could
be necessary for effective education. These improvisa-
tional efforts included a spatial arrangement (e.g., where
to place the paraphernalia) that optimized the quality of
information and communication.
Frictions between bureaucracies did not take place
between the DOH and other departments. Rather, they
existed within the DOH itself, as manifested in the
choice of methadone over buprenorphine. This example
is an excellent illustration of the differences in opinion
between TCDC, then in charge of the harm reduction
policy from an endemic control perspective, and the
National Bureau of Controlled Drugs (NBCD), a DOH
branch supervising the production, registration, and
proper use of controlled narcotics including morphine,
methadone, and other opiates. TCDC preferred metha-
done because of its administrative familiarity, lower
cost, better known (not necessarily fewer) adverse effects,
and a longer history of clinical use. By contrast, buprenor-
phine, especially when it is combined with naloxone (e.g.,
Suboxone®) to prevent intravenous use, has less addictive
potential and less danger when overdosed. Thus, the
NBCD advocated buprenorphine/naloxone as a better op-
tion for maintenance treatment. However, its high price
and the relative lack of experience in large-scale im-
plementation made this combination an unfavorable
alternative [12]. Such frictions and their resolutions
reflected the contradicting rationalities of the govern-
ment. NBCD preferred the option that was less addict-
ive and dangerous, but TCDC wanted a safe and
inexpensive fix to the threat of an impending epidemic
of HIV/AIDS. Eventually, the judgment call was made
by the one “in the driver’s seat” (i.e., TCDC), as one
respondent informed me.
The lack of coordination occurred not only among
different units in the central government but also be-
tween the central and the local health authorities. A
local health director described the policy as a back and
forth feedback process between TCDC and the local
health bureaus.
“TCDC knew of the problem, but it did not know
what to do, so in the end it was we that first proposed
the policy measures. They simply said yes, let’s find
some other counties or cities to do this, a pilot
program. A pilot program that each county or city
made on its own, because TCDC did not have a better
way or method that they saw fit.”
Contrary to being a well-orchestrated plan, the harm
reduction program set out to be a “policy by crisis,” as
another of my respondent aptly described. A “policy by
crisis” in this case means the policy was expected to
solve the problem at the lowest cost in the shortest time.
Consequently, a loosely connected assemblage emerged,
which I call the office elsewhere [12]. The office is com-
posed of heterogeneous components and participants
with varied concerns and ideologies in the processes of
policy organization and implementation. The office is
pivotal to policymaking and the eventual social reconfig-
uration brought about by the policy.
In addition to the inter-departmental coordination or
the lack thereof within the government, the assemblage
of harm reduction policy in Taiwan is also salient in its
transnational dimension, which can be understood in
terms of epidemiology, diplomacy, and practical policy
know-how.
First, the findings in molecular epidemiology indicated
that the HIV strain that caused the epidemic was similar
to the one that originated in China [13–15]. These find-
ings imply that a transmission route from China to
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Taiwan could be attributed to the increase in mutual com-
munication over the years. A number of respondents in
my interview series corroborated this speculation. For ex-
ample, a senior addiction psychiatrist recalled that in the
early 1990s, illegal substances such as amphetamine and
heroin increased during the post-martial law period.
“When more trade among Taiwan, Mainland China,
and Southeastern Asia prospered, many people traveled
to places like Thailand and Hong Kong, and sneaked in
drugs,” he stated. The transnational spread of HIV
followed the transnational trajectory of drugs and set
the stage for harm reduction, which is a transnational
assemblage through and through.
Second, given that contagious diseases, such as HIV/
AIDS and severe acute respiratory syndrome, do not
recognize national borders, participation of and coord-
ination through international health communities are
particularly indispensable. The recently proposed One
Health concept attests to the importance of inter-
national coordination, particularly in light of infectious
diseases such as HIV and globally transposable addict-
ive substances. However, given that Taiwan is not a
member country of the United Nations and World
Health Organization, the country is isolated in this re-
spect. This awkward political situation often baffles en-
thusiastic technocrats. An upset, middle-rank health
officer stated the following:
“When WHO becomes a political organization, it
becomes relatively unfair to Taiwanese people. Why
should we be treated like this? Somewhat like a
colonized land but worse than the status of a colony.
A colonized land at least has a ruling master, but we
have nothing. We simply lack an identity to
participate…to gain a vision for Taiwan and connect
with the international community. Our director hopes
our [harm reduction] program can achieve that goal.
Anti-TB or anti-AIDS, it does not matter.”
Although I do not entirely agree with his viewpoint,
particularly on the part of being worse than a colony, I
do sympathize with his pain and helplessness as a pol-
icy organizer. He also raised a point that this harm re-
duction policy, if done well, can be a useful leverage
for Taiwan to acquire international recognition. This
ambition, although not overtly spelled out, appears to
be shared by many contributors of this policy. Thus, a
domestic policy such as harm reduction always aims
for global recognition.
Third, the early stage of Taiwan’s harm reduction pol-
icy was characterized by local wisdom and experience
crystalized in the proposed plan, as well as by foreign ex-
perts and suggestions that guided health organizers and
workers through policy implementation. Policy designs
and experiences were also appropriated selectively on
the basis of informal connections, such as personal rec-
ommendation and familiarity. Although the USA has
often been used as an example, influences from Australia
and Hong Kong were more valued during the strategy
design. A former TCDC officer recalled her business trip
to Australia, where she encountered Dr. Alex Wodak:
“He was very enthusiastic, and he scheduled our
trip to NGOs, religion-based detox programs, safe
injection rooms, and sexually transmitted diseases
prevention stations in the red light district. Everything.
A whole package. When we returned, we invited a
professor from the University of North Wales (sic)
to train our people to implement the pilot program
of harm reduction.”
Considering the lack of formal connection with and
official assistance from the international community,
the knowledge and information comprising the policy
came from the online sources of international organiza-
tions such as UNAIDS and UNODC and through inter-
national conferences, workshops, educational tours,
and talks of invited foreign experts. These materials, in-
cluding treatment guidelines, self-help guidebooks, and
even forms for clinical or administrative use, were ei-
ther translated into Chinese or revised for local use.
Hence, the materials were assembled but were not well-
organized. These efforts demonstrated a two-way process
wherein central and local governments reciprocated and
government and NGOs worked in parallel. Despite their
shared commonalities, these efforts through informal and
meandering channels were illustrative of the transfer
process of the policy, which is distinct from that of other
countries sponsored by UNODC, WHO, or regional HIV/
AIDS organizations such as Asian Harm Reduction Net-
work [16, 17].
Policy success and its discontents
In four short years, the severity of HIV infection
among IDUs dropped drastically and MSM once again
became the major risk factor (Fig. 1). Thus, the harm
reduction policy of Taiwan was showcased by TCDC as
a success in public health administration. In 2009,
TCDC decided to “routinize” the harm reduction pol-
icy, including assigning the responsibility of supervising
methadone maintenance treatment to the Division of
Medical Affair because this treatment became a regular
medical practice and not an emergent measure against
endemics. Thereafter, the central government under-
went a series of re-structuring over the next few years.
In 2013, the new Ministry of Health and Welfare re-
placed the old DOH in terms of health policies and a
unit under its Division of Mental and Oral Health was
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exclusively devoted to substance use. According to
available information on the website of the Ministry of
Health and Welfare, there were 108 certified hospitals
for substitutive treatment and 54 medicine-distributing
sites (usually health stations and local clinics) in De-
cember 2015. In February 2016, there were 837 distri-
bution sites for clean needles and syringes, 417 vendor
machines selling clean needles and syringes, and 651
sites for recycling used paraphernalia [18, 19]. At first
glance, the implementation of this policy seems to have
been successful. However, some questions remain unsolved.
A successful policy achieves its goal. In this case, the
policy goal of harm reduction is to decrease the num-
ber of HIV-positive drug users, as stated in the monthly
reports of TCDC. However, the decline of newfound
HIV-infected IDUs actually occurred (around July
2005) prior to the implementation of the harm reduc-
tion policy on the ground [8, 20]. In that case, is it still
valid to say that the policy is successful? Which part of
the policy is the most effective and warrants more
resources?
This decline-before-policy issue has been addressed
and explained by several authors [7–9, 20]. These ex-
planations point to the effect of large-scale screening
prior to the policy implementation [7], highlight the
importance of NGOs in promulgating health informa-
tion among vulnerable populations [8, 21], or conceive
of the policy as a platform for building citizen addicts
by realigning responsibilities and entitlements [20].
These explanations may stand at the same time, but
altogether, they uncover some pivotal issues concerning
the evaluation of this policy: When does the policy start
in terms of its effects? What and who should be in-
cluded in the assessment, and for what? How should
this policy be evaluated?
My intention here is to point out that, in a sociological
sense, these questions concern the range of governance
for HIV/AIDS and drug use. For the sake of clarity, a
nuanced difference has to be delineated between govern-
ment and governance: the former often refers to the
administrative institutions and policy decisions that exe-
cute the plan of governing, whereas the latter tends to
address the collective understanding and behavioral ori-
entations that constitute the activities and effects of gov-
erning. When the focus shifts from policy to governance,
the exact date of policy implementation will no longer
be important. At this point, what really matters is the
insidious and gradual formation of a collective under-
standing, along with its behavioral consequences, that
certain health ideals (e.g., not sharing diluting solution
and contaminated needles) should be encouraged and
reinforced through a series of governmental strategies.
A seasoned psychiatrist, one of the first harm reduc-
tion practitioners in Taiwan, described the method of
information transmission among IDUs. He stated that in
clinical settings, “[IDUs] do not seem to read newspa-
pers often; they do not watch TV often, either….But the
power of word of mouth is tremendous among them….”
Later during the interview, he further explained why
methadone maintenance treatment alone cannot ac-
count for the effects of harm reduction: “Methadone
coverage is comparatively low. It’s less than 10,000 per-
sons now, but it is estimated that there are 60,000 to
80,000 heroin users all over the country.”
The power of word of mouth is generally believed to
have existed among this clandestine group of IDUs long
before the pilot program. Thus, the discussions, deliber-
ations, and formulations before the formal implementa-
tion of a policy may facilitate the transmission of health
information and generate the health outcomes antici-
pated by the policy. The assessment of a policy’s success
should not focus merely on governmental efforts after a
policy is announced and implemented. Sometimes, a
policy becomes active before it is even announced to be
active; hence, more participants should be taken into ac-
count, especially those who are covert or implicated.
NGOs are certainly pivotal contributors [8], but people
who would not otherwise be considered as educators,
such as parole officers and prosecutors, also play a role
in distributing information and facilitating communica-
tion. In other words, information, education, and com-
munication in the notion of drug and HIV education
must be understood in a broader perspective [11].
For example, deferred prosecution is a semi-compulsory
strategy, in which arrested drug users are mandated to
participate in an OMT in exchange for a withheld pros-
ecutorial process. A prosecutor who contributed to this
measure associated his motives with previous collabo-
rations with environmental groups to manage illegal
garbage disposal and community life camps, in which
prosecutors worked with school educators. In these
camps, prosecutors encountered problematic youths
from various educational institutions and attempted to
redirect their interests and energy by way of group ac-
tivities. Through these interventions, enthused prosecu-
tors not only forestalled the possibility of disruptive
behavior but also familiarized themselves with the so-
cial reality of crimes and criminals.
“This practice makes prosecutors more than the
people in power that deal with [criminal] cases.
They may care for many things and open their minds.
They will pay attention to how to tidy up their
communities….Harm reduction is something similar
that we do.”
In my study, many―if not all―prosecutors and par-
ole officers shifted among the roles of punishment,
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surveillance, and education. However informal, un-
recognized, and non-certified, they are indeed health
educators in a pragmatic sense [11].
These considerations lead us back to the last ques-
tion: How should we evaluate the policy? Considering
that the implemented policy is part of the harm reduc-
tion governance, an adequate evaluation must first
problematize the extent of the policy rather than take it
for granted. Moreover, instead of viewing the policy as
a three-pronged program, as claimed by TCDC, a com-
prehensive evaluation necessitates that this policy
should be understood as being embedded in a large
number of participants and actions that collectively
constitute the eventual contour of measures categorized
as harm reduction. Thus, a more pertinent question
would be “Where do we draw the line between what is
harm reduction and what is not?”
Discussion
This article provides a sociologically informed analysis of
the harm reduction policy and addresses several issues
specifically observed in Taiwan but may also be shared
by other Asian countries. Without sugarcoating the pol-
icy process, this article demonstrates the ways in which
various participants, regulations, and institutions were
assembled internally and externally to make the harm
reduction policy work. By doing so, this article aims to
problematize the claimed policy success and endeavors
to suggest that the key factor may lie in the facilitation
of communication among a multiplicity of stakeholders,
planners, participants, and policy targets beyond the
usually defined policy scope. This perspective can be evi-
denced by the fact that some mistakes in the early phase
of policy implementation (such as distributing syringes
of wrong sizes and wrapping up health information in
oversized packages) could be attributed to the ignorance
and misunderstanding of policy targets, i.e., IDUs [9].
My research repeatedly showed that an in-depth dia-
logue with IDUs effectively enhances the efficacy of
health education by aligning the needs of IDUs with the
purposes of health promotion [11].
Conclusions
In conclusion, portraying the policy as an assembling
process has several advantages that I believe will benefit
our understanding of the ways in which harm reduction
may develop in Asia. First, this approach will help us see
the policy as a complex process with multiple directions
of exchange of knowledge, personnel, and resources.
The idea of an assemblage implies a heterogeneous and
precarious connection that is neither easily stabilized by
state action nor explained away by participants’ common
goals. What my research found is an aggregate of partici-
pants with diverse professional orientations and practical
concerns. Although professionals working with people
with HIV temporarily formed liaison with addiction spe-
cialists, the cooperation became shaky and intermittent
once the harm reduction policy in Taiwan lost momentum
around 2009. These associations and disconnections, ani-
mated by policy changes, seriously affected the real every-
day lives of drug users on the street. Therefore, a policy is
a collective social action that involves not only the street
but also the office [12], the communication and inter-
action between both being an empirical question that is
open to further scrutiny.
Second, this article also stresses the transnational as-
pect of harm reduction policy, which is crucial to the
rest of Asia, because harm reduction as a concept and a
practice is mostly an “imported” thing for most Asian
countries. Influences and directions from international
organizations or non-formal channels are significant and
warrant further clarification and investigation. More
comparative studies will be needed to examine how this
transnational perspective illuminates not only the simi-
larities and differences but also the continuities and dis-
junctions between policies of different Asian countries.
This type of research will help build a transnational li-
aison against diseases such as HIV/AIDS.
Third, the assemblage approach implies a dynamic un-
derstanding of the policy processes in Asian countries.
This approach is helpful given the trend of drug use and
policy reformulation. For example, Taiwanese scholars
showed that drug crimes involving Schedule I controlled
substances have steadily decreased over the recent years,
but crimes involving Schedule II substance (mainly am-
phetamines) have been slowly increasing [8]. In the past
few years, party drugs such as ketamine and ecstasy
became a new focus of drug control and HIV/AIDS pre-
vention in Taiwan because of their association with sex-
ual behavior. The vicissitudes of the patterns and “fads”
of drug use implies the necessity of repeatedly forming a
new assemblage of harm reduction with new partici-
pants, interventions, and new medications. Distributing
clean needles and syringes obviously does not work in
this case. For enthusiastic harm reduction workers, the
wax and wane of governmental attention on drug use
and HIV/AIDS raises the importance of learning the
ways of a fox rather than those of a hedgehog.
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